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Multiple Liability, Multiple
Remedies, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure
In the following Article, Professor Bauman explores the
effectiveness of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in coping with some of the perplexing procedural prob-
lems which arise in multi-party, multi-remedy litiga-
tion. His discussion is broken down into three separate
areas. In the first situation, the liability of the defendant
is alternative. In the second situation, the defendant's lia-
bility is joint and several; whereas in the third situation,
the liability is cumulative. The author concludes that the
Federal Rules have eliminated the problems presented by
restrictive and technical rules of pleading and when meas-
ured against the standard of "the maximization of redress
for the injured in the character of pursuers, with the mini-
mization of hardship on the innocent in the character
of defendants," are a "notable achievement."
John A. Bauman*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most fascinating chapters in the history of American
law is the development of multiple remedies to redress a single
wrong. The origin of this unique situation may be found in the
evolutionary character of the common-law forms of action and in
the establishment of an entirely distinct system of equitable relief.
With the adoption of the code system of procedure, the forms of
action and the separate bill in equity were abolished, to be re-
placed by the code "one form of action." An injured party thus
had available in one action alternative remedies which formerly
*Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
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could only haye beep obtained in separate actions or. courts, and
which were based on theories:hisforically inconsisfent.: In addition,
if multiple defendants were liable to suit, and their liability in turn
was alternative, joint, or cumulative, procedural complications were
inevitable. -These ,difficulties arose not only frQm restrictive and
outmoded provisions governing joinder, but also from the applica-
tion of an election doctrine requiring a litigant to make a binding
choice of remedy or defendant while .the facts were still unde-
veloped and uncertaiih.'
The unsatisfactory result reached by cases involving these
problems has been the subject of much criticism, . and various
remedial measures have been proposed 'and adopted. One such
reform is the adoption of liberal pleading rules. This approach is
exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The effec-
tiveness of these rules in solving procedural problems raised by
multi-party, multi-remedy litigation is the subject matter of this
Article. Three situations are considered. In the first, liability of
the defendants is alternative, in the second, joint and several, and
in the third, cumulative. The last two situations are further com-
plicated by the availability of multiple remedies against each
defendant.
I. ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY
A problem of alternative liability is presented when two or
more persons are liable to another but judgment may be entered
against only one of them.' This occurs in cases involving an undis-
closed principal, where the plaintiff is compelled to elect whether
to hold liable the principal or the agent. When an action is pur-
sued to judgment against either party, the prevailing rule is that a
subsequent action against the other is barred even though the first
judgment remains unsatisfied.3 According to the English rule the
subsequent action is barred even though there is no actual knowl-
edge of the agency relationship at the time the first action is tried,
since the problem is regarded as one of merger.' Plaintiff has
one cause of action and, having pursued it to judgment, the ob-
ligation is merged and no subsequent action can be had against
the other party. The American rule is generally explained on an
election basis, and hence knowledge of the agency becomes rele-
1. The classic article on election of remedies is Deinard & Deinard,
Election of Remedies, 6 MINN. L. REv. 341,480 (1922).
2. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 100 (1942).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 210(1) (1958); 1939 N.Y. L.
REV. COMM'N REP. 281-84; 7 ALI PROCEEDINGS 256 (1928-1929).
4. MECHEM, AGENCY § 156 (4th ed. 1952).
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vant.' If the agency relationship is undisclosed, plaintiff may
bring a subsequent action against the principal since no election
can take place in the absence of knowledge.' On the other hand, if
the action is brought against either party after disclosure of the
agency relationship, an election occurs (at least if the action is
pursued to judgment) and a subsequent action will be barred.7
What is needed to correct the injustice inherent in this situation
is the adoption of a rule that an unsatisfied judgment against one
party does not bar recovery from the other, but this requires a
change in the substantive law of agency.' In the absence of such a
change, rules of procedure can aid a plaintiff only in situations
where knowledge of the agency exists. This is true because under
the American rule, a subsequent action is not barred if knowledge
of the agency is lacking, hence plaintiff needs no help. Under the
English rule, a subsequent action is barred even though the agen-
cy was undisclosed, hence no procedural rule can possibly help
the plaintiff.
In situations where the plaintiff does have knowledge, pro-
cedural rules may hamper him in two ways. First, joinder of the:
two parties may be forbidden.' In such cases, plaintiff must choose
which defendant to pursue prior to the establishment of the agency.
If the putative principal is chosen and the agency cannot be es-
tablished, plaintiff must at best commence a new action against the
agent. If the agent is sued first and a judgment is obtained
against him, a subsequent action against the principal is barred by
the doctrine of election.
The second and more usual problem facing the plaintiff is the
application of an election doctrine prior to judgment. Regardless
of whether or not joinder is permitted in the pleading, an elec-
tion of defendants may be required at some point prior to or dur-
ing the trial." The time for making an election is of crucial im-
5. Id. § 158.
6. Ibid.
7. 1939 N.Y. L. REv. COMM'N REP. 281-84; MECHEM, AGENCY § 158
(4th ed. 1952).
8. 7 ALI PROCEEDINGS 256 (1928-1929) (remarks of Professor
Seavey); MECHEM, AGENCY § 159 (4th ed. 1952); Merrill, Election Be-
tween Agent and Undisclosed Principal: Shall We Follow the Restatement?
12 NEB. L. BULL. 100 (1933); Note, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 409 (1951); see
N.Y. Civ. PR~c. ACT § 112-b.
9. Weil v. Raymond, 142 Mass. 206, 215 (1886); CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
ING § 60 (1947); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1758 (2d ed. 1914); see 1939
N.Y. L. REV. COMM'N REP. 283 n.258. For the analogous rule that *a
master and servant could not be joined, see Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F.2d 35(D.C. Cir. 1942); Note, 26 MINN. L. REv. 730 (1942).
10. Tew v. Wolfsohn, 77 App. Div. 454, 79 N.Y. Supp. 286 (1902),
aft'd on other grounds, 174 N.Y. 272, 66 N.E. 934 (1903) (election at the
1962]
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portance, but any rule requiring an election prior to an actual de-
cision of the agency relationship is particularly hazardous for the
plaintiff.
In Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane," the Federal Rules
were interpreted by the district court to give the greatest possible
advantage to the plaintiff. In that case, an action was brought
seeking damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of grapes.
Both the agent, Crane, and the partially disclosed principal, Ka-
zanjian, were joined as defendants. At the close of the evidence,
both defendants moved to compel an election between the agent
and the principal. The motions were not passed upon by the court,
but "were taken under submission." The court later ruled that
this was a question of procedure governed by the Federal Rules,
and that a proper interpretation of the joinder rules compelled a
conclusion that the motions should be denied. Otherwise, said the
court, "to compel a plaintiff to elect which party defendant it de-
sires to hold liable is tantamount to compelling him to dismiss
against the other defendant prior to the court's adjudication as to
the liability of the parties."' 2 The court concluded that counsel for
plaintiff "is hereby given permission to make an election, in writ-
ing, and prior to the entry of the judgment, as to which respondent
he desires to hold liable in damages in this case."'" The choice
was an easy one, since the court had previously ruled that Crane
had acted without authority and that Kazanjian was therefore
not liable for the unauthorized acts of the agent.
The case illustrates the extent to which good procedural rules
can aid a litigant.'4 Joinder of both agent and principal as defend-
ants is permitted, and an election is postponed until entry of judg-
ment. Further than this procedural rules cannot go. If the unjust
election rule is to be completely obliterated, a change in the sub-
stantive law of agency must be made.
To be distinguished from such cases of alternative liability are
situations in which a single injury has been sustained but plaintiff
close of the evidence); Schwartzreich & Goodman Co. v. Quitman, 181
N.Y. Supp. 784 (App. Div. 1920) (election at the close of the evidence);
The Jungshoved, 290 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1923) ("election in limine"); STEPH-
EN, PLEADING § 24, at 46 (2d ed. Andrews 1901). For a discussion of
some of the other meanings of election, see 5 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 1214(1951).
11. 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948), commented on in 24 IND. L.J.446 (1949). See also Merrill, Election (Undisclosed Agency) Revisited, 34
NEB. L. REv. 613 (1955).
12. 79 F. Supp. 117, 139 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
13. Id. at 140.14. See also dicta in Ore S.S. Corp. v. D/S A/S Hassel, 137 F.2d 326,
330 (2d Cir. 1943).
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is unable to determine which one of several persons is the culpable
party. Since only a single cause of action against a single wrong-
doer exists in these cases, no question of alternative liability
arises. Instead, the problem is one of alternative joinder. Such
joinder was forbidden at common law'" and by judicial interpre-
tation of some of the codes.'" As a result, plaintiff was forced to
sue each of the suspected wrongdoers separately, and unless a con-
solidation for trial was ordered, plaintiff was presented with the
unpleasant prospect of meeting in each trial evidence tending to
prove that parties not joined were the wrongdoers.
To forestall this possibility, many codes of procedure, includ-
ing the Federal Rules, permit joinder in the alternative.1 7 The only
limitation on this right is the proviso that the joined actions must
involve a common question of law or fact arising out of the same
transaction, a condition easily met in this type of case. To state a
claim immune from demurrer-type attacks, plaintiff need only al-
lege that there has been an invasion of some legally protected
right and that it cannot be determined which of the named de-
fendants is the culpable party."
Drafting a pleading meeting this rule is thus a simple task, but
other substantial procedural problems remain. Plaintiff retains
the burden of establishing a prima facie case against one or more
of the defendants at the close of his case-in-chief. As stated by a
federal court interpreting the New York alternative joinder provi-
sions:
I take it that the burden still rests upon the plaintiff, at the close of
the entire case, to produce something more than surmise to show which
defendant is culpable, and that any defendant against whom there is
nothing more than surmise is entitled to a directed verdict.' 9
Thus in cases where the plaintiff joins defendants in the al-
ternative, the sufficiency of his proof may be tested at the close
of his case by a motion for a dismissal, directed verdict, or some
15. 1 CHITTY, PLEADING 86-87 (14th Am. ed. 1872); SHiPMAN, COM-
MON-LAW PLEADING §§ 227-28 (3d ed. 1923); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
§ 59, at 373-78 (1947).
16. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 62, at 393 (1947).
17. FeD. R. Civ. P. 20(a); see Metrakos v. New York Cent. R.R., 12
F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1951); George v. Long Transp. Co., 11 F.R.D. 305
(N.D. Ohio 1951); Flood v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 10 F.R.D. 393 (N.D.
Ohio 1950); United States v. Carolina Warehouse Co., 4 F.R.D. 291 (W.D.
S.C. 1945); Woods v. Parsons, 7 F.R.D. 528 (D. Neb. 1947).
18. Taiyo Trading Co. v. Northam Trading Corp., 1 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.
N.Y. 1940).
19. Julius Klugman's Sons, Inc. v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 42 F.2d 461,
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
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other appropriate procedural device. The New York court has
ruled that such a motion should be denied, stating that liability
"need not be definitely fastened, at the end of plaintiff's case, on
one precise defendant."2 Rather, said the court, "the defendants
are called upon then to exhibit their conduct in the custody of
the goods, and thus fix the liability as between themselves."'
Ordinarily defendants will "exhibit their conduct" because of
their uncertainty as to the sufficiency of the evidence against them.
A refusal by defendant to accept the court's invitation, however,
presents a question as to whether a suitable sanction exists to pun-
ish a defendant who is unwilling to proceed. In a number of cases,
this difficulty is avoided because the plaintiff actually sustains his
burden of proof through the use of a presumption. Thus in Julius
Klugman's Sons, Inc. v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.,22 in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence, a presumption fastened liability on the
last custodian of the missing property. The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may have a similar effect in tort cases.23 If there are no
presumptions shifting the burden of coming forward with the evi-
dence, the only available sanction against the recalcitrance of the
defendants appears to be a shift in the burden of proof to them.
There is no indication that any such change was contemplated by
the rules, and cases in the federal courts involving alternative
joinder have neither posed this question nor attempted to answer
it.2" This may mean that the question is largely academic because
the uncertainties of proof force a defendant to produce evidence
exculpating himself from liability in the vast majority of cases. If
defendants do refuse to produce evidence it seems highly unlike-
ly that a federal court would shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendants, and in the absence of evidence singling out any particu-
lar wrongdoer, a dismissal of plaintiff's case would seem to be
reqiired.25 The problems of proof cannot be solved by a liberal
joinder rule.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Unlike the prior cases, plaintiff in this situation may obtain re-
dress for his injury from more than one defendant. The example
20. S. & C. Clothing Co. v. United States Trucking Corp., 216 App. Div.
482, 486, 215 N.Y. Supp. 349, 352 (1926).
21. Ibid.
22. 42 F.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
23. See the valuable discussion in McCoid, Negligence Actions Against
Multiple Defendants, 7 STAN. L. REV. 480 (1955).
24. All of the cases cited note 17 supra involved pleading attacks.
25. See in accord McCoid, supra note 23, at 505.
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chosen to illustrate this situation is the case of multiple conver-
sions. In such cases, plaintiff has a claim against all participants in
the wrong, each of whom is jointly and severally liable for the in-
jury. Not only does plaintiff have multiple causes of actions, he
also has available against each wrongdoer a number of alternative
remedies for righting the wrong done to him. Thus plaintiff may
sue in tort for compensatory damages, in quasi contract for resti-
tution of the value of the benefit derived from the conversion, in
replevin for recovery of the specific chattel itself, and in equity,
where the remedy at law is inadequate, to obtain a mandatory in-
junction compelling the defendant to return the chattel or to im-
pose a constructive trust on its proceeds.26 The complications in-
herent in this situation are obvious and arise even in the simplest
cases. Suppose that plaintiff chooses to sue in tort for the value
of the converted chattel. It would obviously be desirable to join
all of the converters in one action, but this was impossible at com-
mon law unless the conversions were joint.2" A like result was
reached by interpretation of some of the codes for the reason that
no one defendant is affected by the cause of action stated against
any of the other participants in the wrong.2" If separate actions
are filed, either because joinder is forbidden or by choice, there
are problems as to the proper measure of damages in the case of
successive converters, some of whom may have acted in good
faith.29
26. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290
Fed. 712 (2d Cir. 1923); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Fancher, 145
N.Y. 552,40 N.E. 206 (1895); WooDwARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 270 (1913);
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 128, comment e (1937); cf. RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 62, comment k (1942).
27. 1 CHITTY, PLFADING 86 (14th Am. ed. 1872); PoMERoY, CODE REM-
EDIES § 210 (5th ed. 1929).
28. Northern Finance Corp. v. Midwest Commercial Credit Co., 59
S.D. 282, 239 N.W. 242 (1931), noted in 30 MICH. L. REv. 1344 (1932);
but see Geneva Gin & Storage Co. v. Rawls, 240 Ala. 320, 323, 199 So.
734, 736 (1940).
29. If the original conversion was in bad faith, the owner may re-
cover not only the value of the chattel at the time of the conversion, but
also the value of any improvement in the chattel made by the converter
subsequent to the conversion. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106
U.S. 432 (1882); Silsbury & Calkins v. McCoon & Sherman, 3 N.Y. 379(1850); contra, Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570 (1872). A subsequent
converter, even though acting in good faith, is liable for this enhanced
value at the time of his conversion, though he is entitled to the benefit of
any services he has performed subsequent to his purchase which further
enhances the value of the chattel. Tuttle v. White, 46 Mich. 485 (1881);
Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491 (1875). If the original
conversion was in good faith, however, the owner is limited to recovery of
the value of the chattel as it existed at the time of the conversion without
the benefit of any subsequent improvement. Wooden-Ware CO. v. United
19621 735
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Restrictive joinder of party rules presents only one of the ob-
stacles confronting the plaintiff. It may also be necessary for him
to pursue a single remedy to obtain redress for his injury. This is
true because many codes in authorizing joinder of causes of ac-
tion adopt a classification system based on the nature of the ac-
tion. These provisions not only preclude the joinder of tort and
contract and legal and equitable causes of action but also contain
a specific prohibition against joinder of inconsistent claims.3" If
a narrow definition of cause of action is then adopted, the plaintiff
finds himself faced with a problem of joinder of causes of action
not within the authorized categories. 3' He must therefore choose
one of his remedies, and where a theory of pleading doctrine is
also applied, the specific theory selected must be proved. The limi-
tation to a particular theory and remedy is further strengthened by
restrictive rules which prohibit amendments changing the cause of
action.32 Even where joinder of alternative remedies is permitted
in the pleading, an election might still be required prior to the
submission of the case at trial.33
Where an adverse judgment is entered against the plaintiff un-
der these circumstances, a question arises as to its effect in a sub-
sequent action against the same defendant. If the judgment is en-
tered on the merits of the claim, it is well established that any sub-
sequent action seeking an alternative remedy against the same
party will be barred by res judicata.34 If the judgment is not on
the merits, however, but is based on a finding that plaintiff had
mistakenly chosen a remedy not available to him, there seems
to be no reason why a subsequent action seeking the proper rem-
edy should be barred, and courts have so ruled.35 There are
cases holding that even in this situation plaintiff is estopped from
States, 106 U.S. 432 (1882); see generally 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §
2.35, at 188 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 927, comment f (1939).
If the conversion is joint, obviously the same measure of damages applies
to all, and if they are joined in one action, an identical judgment must be
entered against each defendant. Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo. 458, 283 P.2d
177 (1955).
30. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 68 (1947).
31. See Note, 38 COLuM. L. REV. 292, 314 (1938).
32. Id. at 312-14.
33. Id. at 315-17. See also CLARK, op. cit. supra note 30, § 77, at 493.
34. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 65, comment e (1942). For a discus-
sion of the effect of such a judgment on a subsequent action against a dif-
ferent party, see text accompanying note 87 infra, and RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 96, comments b & h (1942).
35. Clark v. Heath, 101 Me. 530, 64 At. 913 (1906); Independent
Elec. Lighting Corp. v. M. Brodsky & Co., 118 Misc. 561, 194 N.Y. Supp.
1 (Sup. Ct. 1922); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 65, comment g (1942).
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bringing a second action by the application of the election of rem-
edies doctrine."
A further question arises as to the effect to be given to a fav-
orable judgment in the first action in subsequent actions brought
against the other wrongdoers. Here the position taken is that not
judgment alone,37 but only judgment and satisfaction bars fur-
ther actions.3" Moreover, "no matter how many judgments may
be obtained for the same trespass, or what the varying amounts of
those judgments, the acceptance of satisfaction of any one of them
by the plaintiff is a satisfaction of all the others. . . ."" The the-
ory is that satisfaction of the judgment transfers title to the wrong-
doers, such title relating back to the date of the conversion.4"
While res judicata thus poses no problem in actions brought
against other converters, another procedural hazard is present.
Plaintiff may find that in his first action, an irrevocable election of
remedies has been made. Thus it has been held that where plain-
tiff has waived the tort and sued in assumpsit in the first action, a
subsequent action in tort for conversion is barred against the other
wrongdoers.4 The theory supporting this estoppel is that plain-
tiff in his first action elected to treat the transaction as a sale
and therefore cannot subsequently take the inconsistent position
that there was an unlawful taking and conversion. Conversely,
where the prior action is in tort for conversion, it has been held
that the plaintiff is barred from asserting a claim to the property in
a subsequent action.42 An inconsistency has also been found be-
36. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922); Balti-
more Am. Ins. Co. v. Zimmerman, 127 Kan. 145, 272 Pac. 165 (1928),
rehearing denied, 127 Kan. 509, 274 Pac. 255 (1929); Note, 38 COLUM. L.
REy. 292, 298-99 (1938); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 10 (1949).
37. Atwater v. Tupper, 45 Conn. 144 (1877); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Skill-
man, 52 N.J.L. 263, 19 At. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
38. Osterhout v. Roberts, 8 Cow. 43 (N.Y. 1827); Floyd v. Browne, 1
Rawle 121, 125 (Pa. 1829); MacNeil v. Hazelton, 306 Mass. 366, 28
N.E.2d 477 (1940); cf. STEPHEN, PLEADING § 40, at 63 (2d Andrews ed.
1901) ("The weight of American authorities, however, allows nothing short
of an actual satisfaction. . . ."); but cf. 1 CHrrT, PLEADING 88-89
(14th Am. ed. 1872).
39. Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 11 (1866). See also Livings-
ton v. Bishop, 1 Johns 290 (N.Y. 1806); WOODwARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
§ 297 (1913).
40. Hepburn v. Sewell, 5 Harr. & J. 211 (Md. 1821); see also Siegel
v. Trav-ler Karenola Radio & TV Corp., 333 Ill. App. 158, 76 N.E.2d
802 (1948) (abstract only); Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HAxv. L.
REv. 313, 327 (1890); Comment, Judgment or Satisfaction as Passing Ti-
ie, 30 YALE L.J. 742 (1921).
41. Terry v. Munger, 121 N.Y. 161 (1899); see Korns v. Thomson &
McKinnon, 22 F. Supp. 442, 450 (D. Minn. 1938); 1939 N.Y. L. REV.
COMM'N REP. 221, 290.
42. Deitz v. Field, 10 App. Div. 425, 41 N.Y. Supp. 1087 (1896).
1962]
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tween replevin and conversion, and thus a plaintiff who elects one
of these remedies "thereby deprives himself of any right to resort
to the other." 3
Briefly, these are some of the procedural problems a plaintiff
may face in this type of litigation. Infinite variations can be found
in various jurisdictions, and volumes of criticism could be noted,
but that is another story. The question here considered is the ef-
fectiveness of the Federal Rules in overcoming the procedural pit-
falls thus outlined.
Starting with the simplest problem, the formulation of an ac-
ceptable pleading, the Federal Rules have had an unqualified suc-
cess. The joinder of parties problem is solved by express authori-
zation of Rule 20 permitting joinder when a common question of
law or fact is involved as is true in cases involving multiple con-
versions.4" Moreover, no difficulty is encountered in pleading the
claim merely because alternative remedies are sought. Rule 8
(e) (2) and Rule 18 authorize plaintiff to plead two or more state-
ments of his claim, alternatively or hypothetically, whether legal or
equitable, and regardless of consistency. As a result, an attack on
the pleading by motion because of misjoinder of claims or parties
will fail. Specifically, no election will be compelled at this point
in the proceedings.4
The result reached in these cases seems inevitable because of the
express language of the rules. This does not mean that plaintiff's
problems are solved, however, because the liberality granted to
the plaintiff by the pleading rules might very well be nullified by
restrictive practices adopted at pre-trial and trial. Thus, in immuu-
nizing the pleadings from attack, the application of the election
doctrine may merely have been postponed. The rules themselves
are silent on this question, and in fact do not even mention the
election doctrine. Hence a determination of whether that doctrine
has really been "jettisoned" as one writer asserts,46 depends upon
43. Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290 Fed.
712, 725 (2d Cir. 1923); cf. Satterwhite v. Harriman Natl Bank & Trust
Co., 13 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), noted in 35 MIcH. L. REv. 147
(1936).
44. Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1959).
45. RFC v. Goldberg, 143 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1944); Nachman Spring-
Filled Corp. v. Kay Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1943); United States
v. Temple, 147 F. Supp. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1956); Stark v. Arneson, 96 F.
Supp. 977 (D. Minn. 1951); Boulevard Airport v. Consolidated Vultee Air-
craft Corp., 85 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Norris v. Moon, 9 F.R.D.
214 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Woods v. Parsons, 7 F.R.D. 528 (D. Neb. 1947); see
Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Bay City, 293 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961).
46. James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules,
71 HAv. L. REv. 1473, 1479 n.33 (1958).
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the decisions made by courts in cases where the election issue is
raised.
The federal courts have had to resolve the, question of election
in a number of cases. In understanding the results reached, a dis-
tinction must first be made between cases in which plaintiff is
seeking a single remedy supported by several different legal theo-
ries and those cases in which alternative remedies are sought. If
several rules or theories of substantive law support recovery of a
single remedy, all of these theories may be alleged in the com-
plaint and all theories supported by evidence may be submitted.4'
An election among such theories will not be compelled, for, as
the court states in Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,48
a defendant cannot compel a plaintiff to choose at his peril the the-
ory upon which he intends to rely and thereby possibly defeat a recov-
ery where two consistent, concurrent or cumulative theories can be
urged without prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend.
Where plaintiff actually seeks alternative remedies, as in cases
of multiple conversions, some further distinctions must be made
before the effect of the election doctrine can be stated. If the plain-
tiff either never had an alternative remedy, or has taken some ac-
tion which results in an election of substantive rights depriving
him of an alternative remedy, no election question is presented.49
Plaintiff has merely been mistaken in believing that alternative
remedies existed. In other cases, plaintiff has proceeded to judg-
ment on the merits of a particular theory and has lost. Again in
any subsequent attempt to assert a different remedy, no question
of election is involved, since a prior judgment on the merits bars
further action on the claim.50
The true issue of election is involved in cases where plaintiff
47. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir.
1952); McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.
1949), noted in 50 COLum. L. REV. 114 (1950); German v. Carnegie-Illi-
nois Steel Corp., 156 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1946); Walla v. Sinclair Oil & Gas
Co., 17 F.R.D. 506 (D. Neb. 1955); Porter v. Reid, 79 F. Supp. 898 (D.
Mass. 1948).
48. 127 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D. Colo. 1954).
49. Continental Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis, 162 F. Supp.
814 (W.D. Tenn. 1958); Robinson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 144 F.
Supp. 713 (W.D. Mo. 1956); cf. Satterwhite v. Harriman Natl Bank &
Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), noted in 35 MICH. L. REv.
147 (1936) (court refused to allow a shift in theory which would permit the
plaintiff to take advantage of market fluctuations).
50. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67 (9th
,Cir. 1956); Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa
1958); Schultz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 40 F. Supp. 675
(W.D.N.Y. 1941); see Albert v. Kopplin Molding Corp., 247 F.2d 107, 110
(8th Cir. 1957); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 65, comments d & e (1942).
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has available alternative remedies and seeks those remedies in his
complaint. In considering the disposition to be made of the claim
in such cases, it must be noted at the outset that there is con-
siderable language in the federal cases, particularly prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules, that certain remedies are incon-
sistent. Thus it has been stated at various times that tort and con-
tract,51 tort and quasi contract, 52 or quasi contract and contract 3
are inconsistent remedies, the implication being, of course, that
plaintiff may not seek both remedies for a single wrong.
Under the Federal Rules, as previously noted, all such rem-
edies can now be sought in a single pleading, and attacks on
that pleading will fail. 4 Moreover, it has been held that filing
such a pleading "seeking two inconsistent remedies does not con-
stitute an election to pursue either of them."55 Nevertheless,
there are several cases in which the court in rejecting an attack on
the pleading has indicated that an election would be required at
trial.56 On the other hand, there are cases in which the court has
permitted a plaintiff to submit both a contract and quasi contract
claim, ruling that plaintiff need only "be able to show that it
was proper to submit both counts to the jury; that is to say, failure
to support either would lead to reversal.""7 In other words, plain-
tiff is permitted to submit all counts supported by evidence. Fin-
ally, it has been held reversible error to require an election of al-
ternative remedies in a case where no prejudice could be shown
by the defendant. The court in so deciding stated flatly that "we
51. Nakdimen v. Baker, 111 F.2d 778 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
665, rehearing denied, 311 U.S. 726 (1940) (applying Arkansas law).
52. Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290 Fed.
712, 725 (2d Cir. 1923) (also stating that replevin and conversion are in-
consistent).
53. Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Lilienfeld's Estate, 132 F.2d 887, 893
(4th Cir. 1943); Continental Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Memphis,
162 F. Supp. 814, 831 (W.D. Tenn. 1958); Sanders v. Meyerstein, 124 F.
Supp. 77, 83 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
54. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
55. Morgan v. Hidden Splendor Mining Co., 155 F. Supp. 257, 262
(D. Utah 1957).
56. Paxton v. Desch Building Block Co., 146 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa.
1956); Neumann v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 71 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill. 1946);
Venn-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss Sons Textile Mills, 2 F.R.D. 4, 5
(D.N.J. 1941).
57. North American Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 184 F.2d 387, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). See also Western Machinery Co. v. Consolidated Uranium
Mines, 247 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1957); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conn. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co., 168 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.
1948).
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are certain that there is no room for its [the election of remedies
doctrine] application under applicable rules of procedure."" s
Thus, with the exception of dicta in some cases, the federal
courts have seemingly adopted a rule which permits the plaintiff
to plead and submit alternative remedies if supported by the evi-
dence. There may only be one recovery, of course, since these
remedies are alternative not cumulative, but judgment may be en-
tered for the maximum amount allowable by the evidence.59 It
should follow that in situations of multiple conversions, plaintiff
could submit both his tort and restitutionary remedies, and up-
hold the judgment on either theory. If plaintiff also asserted a claim
for the chattel itself, that claim, if supported by the evidence,
should also be submitted. If all of the claims submitted are
proved, an election at that time must be made, since plaintiff can-
not have judgment both for the chattel and its value.6"
The rejection of the election of remedies doctrine in the federal
courts is not as clearly established in one other important area.
There are statements indicating that the doctrine may be applied
in the classic situation represented by Terry v. Munger61 where
the judgment in a prior action was held to be a conclusive elec-
tion estopping plaintiff from seeking a different remedy in a sub-
sequent action against the other converters. Thus in Korns v.
Thomson & McKinnon,62 the court stated that while a plaintiff
may sue in tort for conversion or waive the tort and sue in as-
sumpsit, "he cannot maintain an action upon an implied contract
as against some of the wrongdoers, and then an action in tort
against other wrongdoers." 3 In United States v. Fleming,4 the
court accepted and stated the traditional rationalization for this
rule. That case involved the conversion of mortgaged property and
its proceeds. The United States brought an action against the as-
signor of the mortgage for the proceeds received from the wrongful
sale of the mortgaged property. This action was held to bar a
subsequent action in conversion for damages against the pur-
chaser of the property since the result of the first action was said
58. Bernstein v. United States, 256 F.2d 697, 706 (10th Cir. 1958), re-
versing United States v. Bernstein, 149 F. Supp. 568 (D. Colo. 1957).
59. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Barnes-Manley Wet
Wash Laundry Co., 168 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1948).
60. Cf. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1221 (1951). The result would be dif-
ferent, of course, if the remedies were cumulative. See Bankers Trust Co.
v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1960); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 64, comment f (1942).
61. 121 N.Y. 161 (1899) cited note 41 supra.
62. 22 F. Supp. 442 (D. Minn. 1938).
63. Id. at 450.
64. 69 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
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to ratify the sale and the purchase was therefore no longer wrong-
ful.
It is difficult to accept this line of reasoning since it is now rec-
ognized by everyone that the first action is treated as one in con-
tract merely to satisfy the historical requirements of assumpsit. 5
The dangers of such a holding may be seen in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Blade,66 a case involving fraud rather than conversion. In
that case plaintiff discovered that for many years its advertising
manager had entered into contracts with the defendant engrav-
ing company because of the payment to him of illegal rebates or
commissions. The first action filed by the plaintiff was for money
had and received against its advertising manager in the state court
to recover the amount of these rebates. This action was successful
and a judgment was entered for the plaintiff for this amount of
money. Plaintiff then brought an action in the federal court charg-
ing the engraver and the manager with conspiracy to defraud. The
district court held that the state court judgment barred further ac-
tion against the manager and dismissed the complaint against
the engraver. The reason given for this ruling was that plaintiff
in the state court action had affirmed the acts of the defendants
and was therefore estopped from bringing an action based on
fraud. By waiving the tort and suing the manager in assumpsit,
plaintiff had made an irrevocable election of inconsistent remedies.
On appeal to the circuit court, the judgment of dismissal against
the engraver was reversed." The court ruled that the causes of
action in the two cases were not identical since each defendant
was charged with a distinct wrong. Thus two different causes of
action arose, and the plaintiff therefore had a right to recover for
the fraudulent overcharges from the engraver in excess of the
amount of rebates recovered in the action against the manager. The
election of remedies question was thus avoided in the court of
appeals, but the opinion nevertheless stated that the doctrine
should not be applied in the absence of double vexation, a factor
missing in the present case since the engraver was only sued
once.
The decision by the court of appeals in the Blade case is a hope-
ful sign that eventually the federal courts will successfully resolve
the election of remedies problem. Once it is recognized that the
65. The best statement of this criticism may be found in United Aus-
tralia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 (H.L. 1940).
66. 123 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Cal. 1954), noted in 53 MICH. L. REv.
1195 (1955).
67. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67 (9th
Cir. 1956).
742 [Vol. 46:729
FEDERAL RULES
law has given the plaintiff alternative remedies for one wrong,
and that fictitious allegations of contract are made merely to satis-
fy the historical vagaries in the development of assumpsit, there
should be no difficulty in arriving at a correct solution.6 8 While
this problem is not specifically governed by the rules, it has been
considered procedural for purposes of Erie,69 and therefore the
considerable body of state law accepting an election of remedies
doctrine is no obstacle to adopting a better rule in the federal
courts.
m11. CUMULATIVE LIABILITY
In the multiple conversion cases just considered, a single injury,
the conversion, was done to the plaintiff, but that same injury was
accomplished by a number of persons, each of whom is jointly
and severally liable. If a contract is repudiated by one party as a
result of the wrongful inducement of another, there results not one
but two distinct injuries. For the breach of contract, the injured
party may seek either compensatory damages for loss of the bene-
fit of his bargain, restitution of the benefit obtained by defend-
ant from plaintiff's partial performance of the contract, or specific
relief in equity in cases where the remedy at law is inadequate.7"
The wrongful inducement to breach the contract gives rise to a
tort action against the wrongdoer, and again multiple remedies
are available. Plaintiff may seek either compensatory damages
for the loss occasioned by the wrong, restitution of any benefit ob-
tained by the wrongdoer as a result of his misconduct,71 or equit-
able relief either by way of an injunction against the wrongful
conduct72 or by the imposition of a constructive trust on the
benefits received from the wrongdoing. 73 Thus having sustained
two injuries, plaintiff has two causes of action and in each cause
of action alternative remedies are available.
68. See the thorough analysis in Note, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1938).
69. Bernstein v. United States, 256 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1958); Woods v.
Parsons, 7 F.R.D. 528 (D. Neb. 1947); but see Note, 31 TUL. L. REV.
547, 549 (1957), citing National Lock Co. v. Hogland, 101 F.2d 576, 587
(7th Cir. 1939) (election of remedies is a "doctrine of substance"); Berger
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1961).
70. Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 512, 36 P.2d 635 (1934); An-
derson v. Bell, 70 Wyo. 471, 251 P.2d 572 (1952); 5 CoRniN, CONTACTS
§ 1105 (1951); WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 260 (1913).
71. Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 157, 184 Ad. 17
(1936), noted in 35 MicH. L. REv. 161 (1936); see 33 MicH. L. REv.
420 (1935).
72. American Law Book Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 41 Misc. 396,
S4 N.Y. Supp. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
73. Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1893).
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Whether the liability of the promisor and the tort-feasor is
cumulative in this situation presents an interesting question. Clear-
ly two causes of action arise in these cases,7 and an action
against the tort-feasor cannot be defeated merely by asserting that
no loss has been suffered because an action for breach of contract
is available.75 If the plaintiff pursues either action to judgment
and recovers, it is also clear that the other remedies against that
particular defendant are barred, since such remedies are admittedly
alternative, not cumulative. 76 The pertinent question is whether
that judgment will also bar further action against the other party.
Assume first that a judgment has been entered against the prom-
isor, and subsequently the injured party seeks further relief from
the tort-feasor. Should that action be barred by the prior judg-
ment in the contract action? On principle, the answer would seem
to be no, though Lord Mansfield doubted "extremely" that an ac-
tion would lie against the tort-feasor after a judgment in the con-
tract action.7" Since plaintiff has two causes of action, it is dif-
ficult to see why judgment without satisfaction should bar plain-
tiff from seeking further relief for his injuries. In Angle v. Chi-
cago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry.,"s the United States Supreme Court
adopted this view. Although a prior judgment had been entered in
an action against the promisor, a constructive trust was imposed on
the benefits the tort-feasor had obtained as a result of the breach
of contract. The fact that a nulla bona return had been filed in the
contract action no doubt influenced the court to take this position.
If the judgment against the promisor has been satisfied, how-
ever, a very practical obstacle faces the plaintiff in subsequent
litigation against the tort-feasor. Proof of damages is an essential
element in the tort action, and if satisfaction has been obtained
from the promisor, plaintiff may have difficulty in sustaining his
burden of proof.79 As Lord Mansfield stated: "Here is no injury
at all done to the master: for, he has recovered and received a
74. Phillips & Benjamin Co. v. Ratner, 206 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1953);
Carl Gutmann & Co. v. Rohrer Knitting Mills, 86 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa.
1949); Horn v. Seth, 201 Md. 589, 95 A.2d 312 (1953).
75. Pilurs v. Elco Constr. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 543, 149 N.E.2d 104
(1958) (abstract only); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 173 N.E. 674(1930); Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954); Raymond
v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 72 S.W. 580, 73 S.W. 800 (1903).
76. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67,
69-70 (9th Cir. 1956); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 64, comments c, d
& e (1942).
77. Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 866, 870 (K.B.
1762).
78. 151 U.S. 1 (1893).
79. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 6.5, at 490 (1956).
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complete satisfaction and more. Therefore all the injury is done
away ... ."SO The same argument of lack of injury has been ap-
plied to bar an action against the tort-feasor in cases where the
plaintiff released the promisor from liability."'
This reasoning is valid only if the identical measure of dam-
ages is applied in the tort and contract action. If a contract meas-
ure of damages is applied in the tort action, it is undoubtedly
true that a prior satisfied judgment against the promisor pre-
cludes further relief in tort since no damages could be proved in
the latter action. The situation is analogous to multiple conver-
sion actions involving a single injury. Yet there are cases that rec-
ognize the tort as a distinctive injury and apply a tort measure of
damages to compensate for that wrong. In these cases, recovery
is allowed for injuries not compensated for in the prior contract
claim. 2 Since plaintiff has two causes of action, and since the
only policy involved is that against a double satisfaction for
one injury, it follows that a prior judgment in the contract action,
even though satisfied, should not prevent recovery of these addi-
tional items of damages.8 3 This same reasoning applies to cases
where plaintiff first obtained a judgment against the promisor for
the alternative remedies of restitution or specific relief in equity.
In the converse situation where plaintiff first sues the tort-feasor,
the same principle applies. If the judgment in the tort action is for
damages, its satisfaction should preclude any further action against
the promisor on the contract. This follows from the fact that even
the least favorable measure of damages, the contract rule, gives
plaintiff complete satisfaction, and double recovery for one injury
is not allowed.84 The significance of two causes of action appears
only when plaintiff fails to get c6mplete satisfaction in the first ac-
tion. Thus if plaintiff sought and was awarded an injunction
against the tort-feasor's misconduct, there would appear to be no
reason why a subsequent action against the promisor for dam-
ages should be defeated even though such damages could have
been recovered in the equitable proceeding against the tort-feas-
or.81 Since the cause of action against the promisor is distinct, no
problem of splitting arises.
80. Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr. 1345, 1352, 97 Eng. Rep. 866, 869
(K.B. 1762).
81. Simon v. Noma Electric Corp., 293 N.Y. 171, 56 N.E.2d 537
(1944); Swift v. Beaty, 39 Tenn. App. 292, 282 S.W.2d 655 (1954).
82. Note, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 232, 240, 242 (1930).
83. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67,
72 (9th Cir. 1956).
84. Note, 30 CoLu-M. L. REV. 232, 242 (1930).
85. Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 64, comment f (1942).
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If the plaintiff suffers an adverse judgment on the merits in the
first action, whether tort or contract, that judgment will bar fur-
ther action against that particular defendant for an alternative
remedy. s6 Whether such a judgment also bars further action
against the other defendant depends upon the rule of res judicata
adopted. By the accepted formulation of the mutuality rule, a
judgment in the first action does not bar a second action against
the other defendant because that defendant is not bound by a
prior judgment favorable to the plaintiff. Application of such a
rule here means that a second action against the other wrongdoer
is not barred by the prior unfavorable judgment. The policy rea-
sons of equality and fairness supporting this result are not always
persuasive, and exceptions have been made where no unfairness
results to the injured party. It has been held that the present sit-
uation is exceptional, since the plaintiff has had his day in court
on the merits of the claim, and there is no good reason why he
should be given a second opportunity to relitigate those same is-
sues. s7 On the other hand, if the first judgment merely decides
that the relief sought is inappropriate, it will bar neither a further
action against the original defendant for an alternative remedy
that is available nor a subsequent action against the other defend-
ant.88
The answer to the original question as to the existence of cumu-
lative liability in this situation thus depends upon the relief sought
and the measure of damages applied in these cases. The proper
standard of damages is a matter of substantive law beyond the
reach of procedural rules. Thus in diversity cases in the federal
court, state law governs. If that law recognizes different measures
of damages in the two actions, a federal court will permit the sub-
sequent action s9
Although the important question of cumulative liability is be-
yond the control of the procedural law, rules of procedure do have
an important effect on the joinder problems arising in such liti-
gation. It should be clear from what was previously stated that
joinder of the promisor and the tort-feasor presents serious ques-
tions under the code.9" The Federal Rules do permit such join-
86. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 65, comments c & d (1942). See also
text accompanying notes 34 & 50 supra.
87. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.
Y.S.2d 1 (1956); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 96, comment a & § 99, illus.
1 (1942).
88. Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 204 App. Div. 776, 198 N.Y. Supp. 766(1923) (equitable relief denied because of unclean hands); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
89. Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
90. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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der,91 and typically this is the course of action pursued by the plain-
tiff.9 2 Substantial advantages obviously result to plaintiff from
such a joinder, but these advantages can be defeated, at least in
part, by permitting a severance for trial as has been allowed in
New York.9 3
The Federal Rules also authorize the plaintiff to seek alternative
remedies in a single action, and as previously noted, the problem
of an election of remedies then presents itself.94 While there is
authority requiring plaintiff to elect at trial whether to seek dam-
ages or rescission,"5 other and better authority permit plaintiff
to submit all remedies supported by proof." In one respect, the
election of remedies doctrine is less troublesome here than in the
multiple conversion cases previously discussed. Since plaintiff has
two causes of action, his choice of remedy in the contract action
cannot affect the remedies available in the tort action.97 Thus
the problem presented in multiple conversion cases such as Terry
v. Munger s is completely avoided here.
CONCLUSION
When Jeremy Bentham, over a century ago, directed his con-
siderable talents toward an examination of the law, one of his
principal concerns was the apparent indifference of judges to the
purposes of the procedural law. Because all rules of law are in
form conditional imperatives, the rules tended to become ends unto
themselves, rather than means to an end. For Bentham the only
defensible object of procedure was "the maximization of the execu-
tion and effect given to the substantive branch of the law."99
While the law as a whole had as its objective "the greatest hap-
91. FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a).
92. Wilson v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809
(N.D. Iowa 1960); Allison v. American Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 37 (N.D.
Okla. 1953); Carl Gutmann & Co. v. Rohrer Knitting Mills, 86 F. Supp.
506 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Canales v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 10 Misc. 2d 583, 172
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Mun. Ct. 1958).
93. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.
S.2d 1 (1956).
94. See text accompanying notes 33, 51-60 supra.
95. Neumann v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 71 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill. 1946);
Venn-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss Sons Textile Mills, 2 F.R.D. 4 (D.
N.J. 1941); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 384, comment b (1932).
96. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co., 168
F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1948); see 5 CoRBin, CONTRACTS §§ 1221-24 (1951).
97. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67,
72 (9th Cir. 1956).
98. 121 N.Y. 161 (1899). See text accompanying note 41 supra.
99. Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure with the Outlines of a
Procedure Code, in 2 JEREMY BENTHMf'S WoRKs 6 (Bowring ed. 1843).
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piness of the greatest number," the adjective law had two specific
ends, "the one positive, maximizing the execution and effect giv-
en to the substantive branch; the other negative, minimizing the
evil, the hardship, in various shapes necessary to the accomplish-
ment of the main specified end."'O0 Thus the problem for Ben-
tham was "how to unite the maximization of redress for the in-
jured in the character of pursuers, with the minimization of hard-
ship on the innocent in the character of defendants."''
When measured against this standard in the three areas exam-
ined herein, the Federal Rules are a notable achievement. Perplex-
ing problems presented by former restrictive and technical rules
governing pleading and joinder have been completely eliminated.
Except for a few decisions and some language honoring the an-
cient dogma in election of remedies cases, the substantive law,
in Bentham's language, has been "maximized." Such problems as
still plague litigants in these cases are found to be problems of
substantive law. Whether justice is achieved and "the greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number" promoted by the election rule in
cases involving undisclosed principals or by a measure of dam-
ages which may preclude recovery from a wrongdoer inducing a
breach of contract depends upon one's view of the proper economic.
and social policies involved. Such a determination involves con-
siderations quite distinct from an evaluation of the procedural law.
On the basis of these considerations, a change may be thought
desirable. If so, the change will not be in the rules of procedure,
but in the substantive law itself.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 9.
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